The war between Israel and Hamas (or is it the war between Israel and Gaza, or Israel and Palestine?) goes on with no end in sight. No end in sight at all.

Yesterday, I attended a private session with someone actively involved in the current situation in Israel and with an extensive history in the area, someone whom I respect, and whose name I cannot share. He gave us his insights. Sure, I found most of them obvious, but some of them were new to me and interesting as I try to put together the entire picture in my mind. Here are some (not all, by any means) of what he said:

(1) In the year 2000, before the Second Intifada, there was a lot of promise in Gaza. Unemployment was down below 15%, there were about 40 factories (maybe averaging 30 Palestinians each) that had been established in Gaza that were turning out goods for export, with the promise of many more. There was a functioning airport, there were still about 10,000 Israeli settlers in the area, communication and travel between Gaza and Israel proper was relatively free. The Israeli military was present to keep the peace.

(2) The failure of the Camp David meeting in 2000 between Barack, Arafat and Clinton, followed by the visit of Sharon to the Temple Mount, changed everything and led to the Second Intifada, and a barrier constructed between Israel and Gaza.

(3) When Sharon pulled the military and the settlers out of Gaza in 2004, he left the factories intact, but the atmosphere had changed, and the election of 2006 (presumably a fair election) put Hamas in charge, eliminating democracy in Gaza and creating a Gazan government determined to wipe out the State of Israel. All of Gaza’s infrastructure fell into ruin.

(4) In addition to skirmishes, there have been two other wars between Israel in Hamas, in 2008-2009, and in 2014.

(5) At the start of the current war, unemployment in Gaza is approximately 45%, with youth unemployment at 70%.

(6) Hamas obviously still wants to see Israel destroyed, and Netanyahu (and a large proportion of the Israeli population) now thinks that a two state solution is completely undesirable. Netanyahu has felt this for a long time – perhaps forever.

(7) Since its creation as an arm of (or a sect of) the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has been a dangerous terrorist organization. It no longer operates as a terrorist organization. Hamas is now an army, a well trained, well financed and well equipped army, and Israel failed to identify it as that.

(8) The October Hamas attack was the result of not just one Israeli intelligence failure, but a series of them, as has been reported. Israel had Hamas’ complete attack plan, although it’s unclear how far up the chain that info had been transmitted – and nevertheless, Israel left its Gaza border pretty much undefended, diverting IDF forces to the West Bank where radical Israel settlers were disrupting things with the virtual approval of Israel’s right wing government.

(9) Today in Israel, the population has moved so far to the right that there is virtually no “left” left. Netanyahu is very unpopular (18% approval rating), but his policies are very popular. The Israel public has no interest in a Palestinian state of any kind at this time and, shockingly, appears to have no sympathy for the suffering going on in Gaza generally.

(10) The heads of Mossad, Shin Bet, and the IDF will resign most likely after the war’s over, but Netanyahu, for his own reasons, will fight to stay and it is very hard to get him out. The only way to do so would be for the coalition to call for new elections, which this won’t happen because so many of the current members would not be reelected.

(11) Netanyahu’s statement that he wants to total destruction of Hamas is only wishful thinking and will prolong the war, and there is still no post-war plan, and virtually no post-war planning going on. 

(12) Miscellany: (a) Who will pay for the reconstruction of Gaza? Perhaps the moderate and wealthy Arab states, but they will exact a price as to how Gaza will operate that Israel will probably reject, (b) There are about 300 miles of underground tunnels belonging to Hamas (where non-Hamas Palestinians are, to this day, not allowed), and Israel at this time only controls about 15% of them, (c) many of the tunnels are booby trapped, hold hostages, and – when Hamas members leave their underground tunnels – tey cannot be distinguished from other Palestinians, (d) it is believed there are about 35,000 members of Hamas, of whom 10,000-15,000 are in the Hamas military, (e) some of the hostages are being held not by Hamas but by Islamic Jihad – they are smaller but even more ruthless than Hamas.

(13) Netanyahu has no reason to want a short war. The longer the war goes on, presumably the safer he is.

That’s all, folks.