Sometimes, things take a long time. For example, American historians’ appreciation of Dwight Eisenhower took decades. And it took an equally long time for the positives of John Kennedy’s presidency to lose their luster, but they have. The 50s were deemed a lazy, unexciting decade where progress was put on hold, where Americans moved to the suburbs and barbequed hamburgers, and white Americans fought against integrating their kids’ schools. The 60s were deemed to be an exciting period where the civil rights movement got its start, and where the Soviets were convinced to take their missiles out of Cuba and destroy their launchers.

But then it turned out that a lot was accomplished during the Eisenhower years. The successes of the Warren Supreme Court, the creation and funding of the Interstate Highway System, keeping the Soviets at bay through, among other things, a little deception. My mind about Eisenhower was changed when I read Evan Thomas’ excellent book, Ike’s Bluff. The abbreviated Kennedy administration, on the other hand, has now been viewed to be less than successful, with the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the start of the Vietnam war, and failure to advance our position with the USSR and China.

So it takes time. Sometimes, a lot of time. You remember the story? A few years ago, an old Chinese philosopher/historian was asked: “What effect do you think Napoleon had on the political alignment of Europe?” His response: “It’s just too soon to tell.”

So what do we feel about Barack Obama? Throughout his presidency and afterwords, compared with the Trump years, I thought Obama was doing quite a good job and today, December 28, 2023, I still think so. But I have friends who will argue the opposite; they will call Obama facile and well meaning, but weak and ineffective, particularly in managing foreign affairs. What will historians say 20 or 40 years from now?

I recently read David Sanger’s book, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power, published in 2013, after Obama finished his first term. Sanger, a New York Times foreign matters reporter, had covered Obama during the first four years of his administration, and had a lot to say. I found this book just a month or so ago, don’t remember knowing about it at any time, and started reading through it by chance, when I picked up a book to take with me for what I was sure would be a long wait in a doctor’s office waiting room.

Clearly not enough time had passed to allow our elderly Chinese philosopher/historian to reach a conclusion, or perhaps for anyone else to, but I learned at least one thing. These were complicated times, and any immediate determination that Obama did, or did not, manage things well is bound to be wrong. Time must pass, and information must settle and mix with information from other sources.

Sanger, I would say, is generally supportive of Obama. And he is very good at providing context for Obama’s actions. A case in point was Afghanistan – we had very good intentions there, but it seemed that our concept of preparing Afghanistan, of all places, for democracy and a democratic regime was misplaced. We recognized that all of our accomplishments might be lost if the Taliban returned, and that perhaps we could not stop them from doing so. Was it worth our effort? Obama decided to tough it out, more or less. Was this the right decision, even after we saw failure in many respects in Iraq, where our goals were similar.

And what to do about Pakistan, which he describes in some detail as an extraordinarily complex place, with political parties of all persuasions, with strident religious groups with expansionist ideas, and intellectuals whose opinions couldn’t not be more different? With nuclear weapons, of course, so far kept unused. A balancing act, to be sure.

Arab Spring. That’s another one. Obama, who had spent the first years of his life surrounded by Muslims, wanted to change the relationship of the United States and the Muslim world. He was not expecting the Arab Spring, and could not help it when the Spring turned into a cold, cold winter. How to deal with Muslim countries – ignore or ally with despotic leaders of countries important to the United States? Taking an active role in Syria, sending in troops to try to maintain some semblance of peace. Taking an active role in Libya, along with both NATO and Arab allies, with the goal of removing Mohammad Qaddafi from power. Using air power in Libya, but having no troops on the ground. Troops on the ground in Syria – but no attempt at regime change. How do explain the difference? And how to measure success when Syria is still under the Bashir Assad regime, and Libya often seems to have no government whatsoever?

And then remember that Obama had a second term, not covered in this book (obviously). Did he learn anything from his first term and, to the extent he did, was Congress at all cooperative in helping to implement his now experienced policy wishes?

After reading Sanger’s book, I have to conclude that I still think that Obama did a very good job during the time he led this country. He made some controversial choices – focusing on health care over certain other domestic issues, for example. And he certainly wasn’t able to overcome the opposition to whatever he did by a highly partisan Republican Congress (remember McConnell saying that his first priority was denying Obama a second term, and Trump and others from the outside declaring Obama to be an alien, ineligible for the office of the presidency?)

But I also know that I have something in common with the old Chinese philosopher: I may be able to throw together a lot of factual information, but can I say for sure that his presidency was a success? No. Why? Because it is much too early to tell.