Tomorrow I am giving a presentation on Saul Alinsky at my morning breakfast group meeting. I’m not going to preview it now, but I am going to focus on two important questions.

I assume you all know who Alinsky was. Chicago born sociologist, who created the concept of community organizing. Author of the community organizing bible, Rules for Radicals, and creator of an ongoing legacy both as an angel and a devil. The subject of Hillary Clinton’s Wellesley senior thesis, and inspiration for Barack Obama’s first jobs out of law school. Target of today’s right wing politicians, and at the same time – believe it or not – designer of today’s right politicians’ tactics.

Now to the two questions .

(1) What would Alinsky think about delivering cluster bombs to Ukraine?

(2). What would Alinsky think about Israel’s attacks on Jenin?

An analysis of how Alinsky might look at these two questions require us to look at his writings on a third, and age-old, question: Do the ends justify the means?

Alinsky would start by analyzing the “ends”. “Ends” which are very important would permit the application of a greater array of “means” that “ends” which are less important. Regarding Ukraine, the “ends” would be the defeat of the Russian invasion and the preservation or recapture of all sovereign Ukrainian territory. That would seem pretty important.

He would then analyze the available “means”. A “means” would be an action that is likely to lead to, or to help lead to, the “end”. We are told that there is a temporary ammunition shortage (the world’s suppliers of ammunition to Ukraine need time to up their manufacture of sufficient ammunition), so that continuing to take the actions that have been so far taken will (at least for the time being) not bring Ukraine closer to their desired “end”. So something new must be tried to keep Ukraine from falling behind in their battle.

What means are available? One “means” might be a massive air strike on Russian military bases within Russian territory. But that particular action might not lead to the “end” desired because it would provoke a serious counterstrike, so Alinsky would reject it.

Another “means” would be the proposed use of cluster bombs instead of whatever ammunition is now in short supply. Let us assume that those who are proposing cluster bombings strongly believe that they would provide an effective way to help defeat the Russians. If Alinsky thought they were incorrect, and that the cluster bombs would not work, he would at this point of course conclude that cluster bombs should not be provided.

But assume he agrees with, or will rely on, those who believe cluster bombs will be effective. He knows, as do they, that cluster bombs have some negative qualities, namely that they increase the chance of the death or injury of civilians. This is a result you would want to avoid to the extent possible, but – in the Alinsky point of view – if your “ends” are important, and if there not any “less offensive” or “more ethical” ways to achieve those ends, it would be appropriate to choose actions that otherwise you would not want to choose. He says, in fact, that in a war time situation, almost anything goes because the “ends” are that important. (He also says not to worry about what you opponents, or even what outsiders, may think about your choice of “means” – they will criticize you, he suggests, no matter what you do, if they don’t value your ends as much as you value them.)

So with regard to Ukraine, Alinsky would probably support providing the cluster bombs.

Now, let’s move to Israel and Jenin. In this situation, the “ends” are the security of the State of Israel. Alinsky would certainly agree that this an important end. But what would he think of the raid on Jenin?

I think his conclusion might be different here than it would be in Ukraine. While cluster bombs have the possibility of causing more civilian death and injury, the raid on Jenin has the certainty of causing more civilian death and injury, as well as causing destruction of homes, businesses and infrastructure.

In addition, while cluster bombs would be a new addition to the arsenal of the Ukrainians, and any conclusions as to their effectiveness would depend on modeling and analysis, the Jenin situation might appear to be very different. The Israelis have conducted Jenin-type raids in Jenin and elsewhere numerous times over the past 50 years and the security of Israel (at least security from cross border terrorist raids) arguably hasn’t become any stronger as a result of the military raids (it’s a different story, perhaps, with the security wall, which has I believe cut back terrorist activity significantly). Alinsky might question whether raids such as this should be conducted at all. If he believed raids of this sort were not effective in helping achieve the ends being pursued, he might say “no” to the entire concept of raiding Jenin.

But because security of Israel is very important, he would then need to look for alternatives to stop terrorists raids. One of Alinsky’s premises with regard to the successful leadership of community protests against another group of people is to keep “the enemy” off their guard – surprise them, counter them with something totally outside the box. Continuing military raids, which have proven ultimately not successful over and over again, do not fit the Alinsky program.

My guess is that Saul Alinsky would oppose the Israeli raid on Jenin. And that, if he was in charge of defending Israel against the Palestinians, you would see a very different set of actions being undertaken to guarantee Israeli security.

I am not saying that Alinsky would be right or wrong in his choices. And Alinsky’s own career as an organizer was filled with both successes and failures, as he himself admitted. But he certainly would not approve of repeating the same mistake over and over, especially when the direct and indirect consequences of that mistake may move you further away from your goal, rather than closer.

So, to answer as best I can, the two questions I have posed, I would suggest that Saul Alinsky would give two very different responses to them.