Yesterday morning, we were part of a group of about thirty who heard a presentation by retired Israeli Brigadier General Yoni Shimshoni on the current state of the State of Israel. Yoni spoke as a representative of a group called The Commanders (not a football team), made up of approximately 600 former high ranking Israeli security officials, from the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the Shin Bet, Mossad, and elsewhere. They have been operating as an informal non-partisan “think tank”, providing advice and expertise to whomever will listen (which apparently does not include Benjamin Netanyahu) on the current situation in which Israel finds itself trapped. Yoni (“call me Yoni”) was born in Israel to American-born parents, is completely fluent in English, has a Ph.D. in Public Policy from Princeton, and served in the active and reserve IDF for 45 years. I did not take notes during his presentation, so even my usual attempt for, say, 80% accuracy may fall apart here. But let me try to give you some of what he said.
Perhaps most importantly, he said that Israel today (and by Israel, he means Israel under its current government) has changed the definition of security on its head, to the consternation of The Commanders. For 75 years or so, Israel has concentrated on its defensive security – warding off large and small scale attacks from its Middle East neighbors, keeping its borders secure, engaging in “short wars” (his term) where necessary. Now, on the other hand, Israel is no longer engaged in defensive security, but in aggressive security, and this is obviously a result of the October 7, 2023 attack from Hamas in Gaza. Now, Israel is not trying to keep its borders secure, but is trying to destroy any potential attackers or scare them out of its immediate neighborhood. This means that Israel is no longer only engaging in “short wars”, but is engaging (with Iran, in Lebanon, etc.) is “forever wars”, and engaging in them aggressively and ferociously. This is a major change – from border protection to a search for ultimate victory.
In the process of doing this, he says, Israel, which has always striven (sometimes more successfully than other times) to have allies (allies in Europe, in Asia, in Africa, and the United States), has decided that allies are not necessary at all. It has alienated virtually the entire world, and does not seem to care. The attitude is: they all hate us and always will, so why pretend otherwise? Even, he says, the United States is no longer a reliable ally – just look at all of the anti-Israel sentiment showing up on both the left and the right in the United States. And, yes, he says, it is the right as well as the left – just as there is a debate about Israel going on within the Democratic Party, there is a similar debate going on in the Republican Party (much quieter, I assume), where there is a growing split among the Evangelicals about how Israel is now using its power.
Israel, says Yoni, has only one ally left. And that ally is Donald Trump. Period. No country, no government. Just Donald Trump.
Digression: after Yoni’s presentation, there has been news of a very harsh conversation between Trump and Netanyahu, where Trump yelled at Netanayhu and told him, were it not for Trump himself, Bibi would be in prison now. And, as a result of that conversation, Israel cancelled or postponed its planned attack on southern Beirut in order for conversations between Washington and Tehran to restart. End of digression.
But what are the goals of Netanyahu and his coalition? Yoni said that, within Israel, there is real talk about annexing the entire West Bank (the Commanders think that would be a big mistake, for all sorts of reasons), but little talk about annexing Gaza (although a minority of Israelis would like to put some settlements in the north of Gaza), the reasons being that Gaza has more people than land and the West Bank more land than people (although there are a lot of people there).
Yoni does not purport to say what will happen if Israel goes ahead with the dismissal of the current Knesset and a new election in the late summer or fall. He says that none of the issues regarding war or annexation are uppermost in the minds of the electorate right now, and there is in fact more focus on domestic issues, and on issues involving the structure of the government (role of the Supreme Court, powers of various governmental positions, drafting religious Haredi into the military, and so forth), and I don’t think he expects that to change.
In response to a question about a two-state solution, he said that, while he thinks (not sure he was talking for the group here, but perhaps he was) the time is not right to lobby for a two-state solution today, but eventually that time will hopefully come. Clearly, in addition to everything else going on, there is a perceived lack of Palestinian leadership that could bring about a viable state; he has no confidence in the Palestinian Authority, not that they don’t have members who mean well and think well, but they simply do not appear to have any influence or following among the Palestinian people.
There were many things that were not discussed (how much can you do in about 90 minutes?), including antisemitism and the effect of Israel’s current activities on antisemitism abroad, Iran, Jordan and Egypt, the Abraham Accords, and so forth. And we did not talk about failure of Israel’s traditional security systems that permitted the Oct 7 attack (think how different everything would be today if that attack had been nipped in the bud).
I found Yoni’s presentation depressing (as I am sure does Yoni), but informative, and it gave me a few new angles from which to view the situation. My take has been that Netanyahu and his guys are doing what they are doing because (a) they believe Israel is militarily at its strongest (and Yoni does say that technically, the IDF now is extraordinarily ahead of the times), and (b) its neighbors (largely the Iran proxies) at what might be their weakest (although Hezbollah seems anything but overly weak), and (c) now is the time to take advantage of that big difference and try to end threats to Israel now and forever. I believe that Netanyahu does this with confidence (of course, perhaps misplaced – time will tell), and that if he is successful, he will be a hero forever, and if he isn’t, he will be dead and won’t care. I believe that my theory and Yoni’s analysis complement each other, although I did not bring this up in the discussion.
What I did ask is: with all the support for what the IDF is doing within the Israel population, and the growing concern for what Israel is doing among the diaspora, what has happened to the world Jewish community? Have Israeli Jews changed so much that they are radically different now from Jews outside of Israel? (Okay, so this isn’t really the way I asked the question; this is the way that I should have asked the question.) I didn’t really get an answer to my question (obviously not, since I didn’t ask it the way I should have), but got an answer that kinda, sorta said that the overall Israeli mentality is not as one-sided as I have posited it to be, and that with change, there will be changes. (Okay, so this isn’t really the way he answered the question, either. But he could have.)
The rest of the day was spent with friends Ken and Larry preparing a Thursday presentation on the US elections, and then watching a really good Haberman Zoom talk by Geraldine Gudefin on the history of the “right of return” in Israel. (www.habermaninstitute.org)



















































